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Note 
The Ashley Treatment: The Current Legal Framework 
Protects the Wrong Rights 
Jillian Kornblatt* 
In 2006 two Seattle doctors performed several procedures 
to attenuate the growth of a profoundly neurologically and 
cognitively disabled six-year-old girl. When the doctors 
described the treatment in a medical journal, the story gained 
worldwide publicity and quickly became the subject of a highly 
contentious and emotionally charged controversy. As a result, 
a federally-sanctioned disability rights protection organization 
conducted an investigation and concluded that the treatment 
should not have been performed without a court order and 
that doing so violated the girl’s constitutional rights. 
Part I of this Note considers the legal framework applied to 
the treatment decision and how the framework would apply to 
other children whose parents requested the treatment. Part II 
then analyzes whether this framework adequately protects the 
best interests and constitutional rights of potential candidates 
for this treatment and their parents. The Note concludes that 
due to its inappropriate focus on the rights to choose to 
procreate and to be free from bodily invasion, the current 
framework does not adequately protect the patient’s more 
relevant rights to dignity, freedom from pain, and life or 
parents’ right to make decisions regarding their children. The 
Note suggests that states should enact statutes narrowly 
tailored to these cases in order to address and protect the 
multiple rights and interests involved in these situations. 
These statutes—which should include procedural safeguards—
should allow the treatment when parents and doctors agree 
that it is in the child’s best interest. 
                                                          
© 2009 Jillian Kornblatt. 
* JD candidate, University of Minnesota Law School; MSW, Hunter College 
School of Social Work; BA, Cornell University. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. THE TREATMENT. 
In October 2006, two endocrinologists described a series of 
procedures that they combined in a novel way to treat one of 
their patients, as a “therapeutic option for . . . nonambulatory 
children with severe, combined neurologic and cognitive 
impairment[s]. . . .”1 After discussing the ethical issues 
involved in the treatments, the doctors concluded that these 
procedures provided a new option for “nonambulatory, 
profoundly impaired” children, which—after adequate 
screening and fully informed consent—parents should be able 
to elect for their children.2 
The endocrinologists’ patient, Ashley, had been diagnosed 
with static encephalopathy,3 of unknown origin.4 Ashley is 
profoundly “neurologically and cognitively impaired,” with an 
IQ too low to be tested.5 At age six years and seven months, 
her mental development was at the level of an infant, and she 
was unable to move, speak, or eat without a feeding tube.6 The 
neurologists, medical geneticists, and developmental 
pediatricians who examined her concurred that no further 
development was expected.7 Between one and two percent of  
                                                          
 1. Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in 
Children with Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an 
Old Dilemma, 160 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1013, 1013 
(2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. MedHelp, 
http://www.medhelp.org/forums/neuro/archive/4948.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2009) (“Static encephalopathy is a general term used to describe a 
general dysfunction in the brain that is not getting worse over time.”). 
 4. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 5. Id.; DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, WASH. PROT. & 
ADVOCACY SYS., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE “ASHLEY TREATMENT,” 
EXHIBIT O LETTER FROM LARRY JONES, PH.D., J.D., TO ASHLEY’S DAD (June 
10, 2004) 2 (2007), available at  http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-
1/Investigative%20Report%20Regarding%20the%20Ashley%20Treatment
_Exhibits%20K%20-%20T.pdf [hereinafter LETTER]. Individuals who are 
too impaired to have their IQs tested are classified as having Mental 
Retardation, Severity Unspecified, while those with IQs below twenty to 
twenty-five are classified as having Profound Mental Retardation. AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 42, 44 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). 
 6. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 7. Id. 
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children with mental retardation are classified as having 
Profound Mental Retardation.8 These children require life-long 
care, which is typically done in specialized facilities.9 
Ashley lived with her siblings and parents, who were her 
primary caretakers.10 Ashley’s care included “body 
movement/placement, feeding, cleansing of respiratory tract 
secretions, facilitation of bowel movements, total body hygiene, 
etc.”11 Using Ashley’s vocalizations as cues, Ashley’s family 
developed a variety of routines they believed gave Ashley 
pleasure. These include frequent moves from room to room of 
their home, rotating décor in her bedroom, taking her on 
outings, and sending her to a special school by bus.12 
When Ashley displayed signs of early puberty and 
accelerated growth, her parents approached Ashley’s doctors 
with their concerns.13 Their primary worry was that despite 
their intention to care for Ashley at home indefinitely, they 
would be forced to institutionalize her when she became too 
large to move without a lift.14 Additionally, they were 
concerned about limited mobility, menstrual pain, and 
discomfort from large breasts, which were common in Ashley’s 
                                                          
 8. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 5, at 44; see also Offord 
Centre for Child Studies, Centre of Knowledge on Healthy Child 
Development, 
http://www.knowledge.offordcentre.com/dev_learn/devdis/dev_dd_about.
html#dd_03 (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (on file with journal).  “The 
prevalence rate of Mental Retardation has been estimated at 
approximately 1%.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 5, at 46. 
 9. Offord Centre for Child Studies, supra note 8; see AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 5, at 44. 
 10. Ashley’s Mom & Dad, The “Ashley Treatment,” (Jan. 2, 2007, last 
updated Mar. 25, 2007), 
http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/default.aspx [hereinafter Ashley’s 
Blog]. Ashley’s mother and father created a website to provide information 
about Ashley and her medical treatment amid the growing speculation 
following the Gunther and Diekema article. Ashley’s parents did not reveal 
their daughter’s full name and wrote the blog under the names “Ashley’s 
Mom & Dad” to preserve the family’s anonymity. Id. 
 11. DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, WASH. PROT. & 
ADVOCACY SYS., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE “ASHLEY TREATMENT,” 
EXHIBIT L SPECIAL CHRMC ETHICS COMM. MEETING/ CONSULTATION  (MAY, 
2004) 2 (2007), available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-
1/Investigative%20Report%20Regarding%20the%20Ashley%20Treatment
_Exhibits%20K%20-%20T.pdf [hereinafter ETHICS COMMITTEE MEETING]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 14. Id.; Ashley’s Blog, supra note 10. 
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family.15 
The doctors explained that through growth attenuation 
treatment, accompanied by a hysterectomy and breast bud 
removal, many of these potential problems could be limited or 
avoided.16 The growth attenuation therapy, performed with 
high doses of estrogen, was anticipated to achieve a forty 
percent reduction in expected weight and a twenty percent 
reduction in expected height.17 In addition to decreasing the 
likelihood of needing a lift or being institutionalized, this would 
allow the family to continue to do the activities Ashley 
appeared to enjoy and by moving her, increase her circulation 
and reduce the likelihood of bedsores and scoliosis from 
immobility.18 
The primary reason for the hysterectomy was to avoid 
menstrual pain.19 Additional benefits included eliminating the 
possibilities of pregnancy through sexual assault or uterine 
cancer.20 Removal of the breast buds, small mammary glands, 
was to prevent discomfort from a wheelchair strap across her 
chest or the chafing straps of a brazier.21 Additional benefits 
were preventing the possibility that fully-developed breasts 
could sexualize her toward possible care-takers and avoiding 
possible breast cancer.22 
Before the procedures were performed, Ashley’s parents 
and doctors met with the Children’s Hospital Ethics 
Committee.23 The committee noted that Ashley’s parents were 
loving, educated, and committed to caring for Ashley in their 
                                                          
 15. See Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014; Ashley’s Blog, 
supra note 10. 
 16. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014; Ashley’s Blog, supra 
note 10; see  Ashley’s Mom & Dad, The “Ashley Treatment” for the 
Wellbeing of  “Pillow Angels,” http://pillowangel.org/AT-Summary.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (summarizing Ashley’s treatments and their 
purposes) [hereinafter Treatment Summary]. 
 17. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014; Treatment Summary, 
supra note 16. 
 18. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014; Treatment Summary, 
supra note 16. 
 19. See Treatment Summary, supra note 16. 
 20. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1015; Treatment Summary, 
supra note 16. 
 21. Treatment Summary, supra note 16. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014. 
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home.24 The committee concluded that the procedure was in 
the patient’s best interest because it would “improve her 
quality of life, facilitate home care, and avoid 
institutionalization in the foreseeable future.”25 The committee 
informed Ashley’s parents that prior to the procedures, they 
should obtain legal advice to ensure that the hysterectomy 
complied with Washington State requirements for sterilization 
of women or girls who could not consent to the procedure.26 
The parents’ attorney, who specialized in disability law, 
advised them that because the procedure was not being 
performed primarily for the purpose of sterilization, a court 
order was not needed to perform the treatments.27 Relying on 
this advice, the doctors performed the procedures without 
obtaining a court order.28 
After the medical journal article was published and the 
public reacted passionately, the girl’s parents created a blog 
about their daughter, whom they identified only as Ashley, so 
they could explain their treatment decisions.29 They named the 
procedures the “Ashley Treatment.”30 Ashley’s story made 
headlines around the world, igniting strong emotional 
reactions and a divisive debate regarding bioethics, the rights 
of disabled children and adults, autonomy, the role of 
medicine, and who should be able to make these decisions.31 
Those weighing in on the debate included ethicists, doctors, 
disability advocates, disabled adults, and families of children 
                                                          
 24. ETHICS COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 11, at 2. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Id. at 2. 
 27. LETTER, supra note 5. 
 28. DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, WASH. PROT. & 
ADVOCACY SYS., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE “ASHLEY TREATMENT” 
1 (2007), available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-
1/Investigative%20Report%20Regarding%20the%20Ashley%20Treatment.
pdf  [hereinafter INVESTIGATIVE REPORT]. 
 29. See Ashley’s Blog, supra note 10. 
 30. Treatment Summary, supra note 16. 
 31. E.g. Catherine Elsworth, Why We Will Never Let Our Girl Grow Up, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Jan. 4, 2007, at 15; Sam Howe Verhovek, Parents 
Halt Growth of Severely Disabled Girl, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at A1; 
Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast Jan. 12, 2007), transcript 
available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0701/12/lkl.01.html; 
Decision to Stunt Growth of Disabled Girl Triggers Debate (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation television broadcast Jan. 4, 2007). 
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and adults with conditions similar to Ashley’s.32 Ashley’s 
parents informed Larry King that as of January 12, 2007, they 
had received over 3,600 private messages, ninety percent of 
which supported the treatment.33 A number of parents of 
profoundly disabled children wrote that they would want or 
were currently pursuing the Ashley Treatment for their 
children.34 
The publicity reached disability-advocate groups, which 
alerted the Washington Protection and Advocacy System 
(WPAS), the Washington agency federally authorized to 
investigate incidents of abuse or neglect of individuals with 
disabilities.35 The family’s attorney wrote that prior 
Washington cases regarding sterilization petitions were not 
controlling because they were distinguishable based on the 
differences in the mental ability of the girls involved and the 
purpose of the procedure.36 The WPAS, however, concluded 
that these cases were controlling, and because the 
hysterectomy was performed without a court proceeding, 
                                                          
 32. Compare Peter Singer, Op-Ed., A Convenient Truth, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2007, Late Edition (East Coast), at A21 (arguing that it is ethical 
for children with disabilities such as Ashley’s to receive this treatment), 
and Lainie Friedman Ross, Growth Attenuation by Commission and 
Omission May Be Ethically Justifiable in Children with Profound 
Disabilities, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 418 (2007), with 
Wesley J. Smith, An Ethically Unsound “Therapy”, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 
8, 2007, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTNhNDAzMzQxM2YwZjkwMjMxZG
Y4Y2FiNDRjZTFkMjM= (arguing that the treatment is unethical and 
should not be allowed), and Hank Bersani, Unjustifiable Non-Therapy, 161 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 520, 521 (2007). 
 33. Larry King Live, supra note 31. The parents provided this 
information by email and have not revealed their identities. 
 34. The “Ashley Treatment,” Testimonies from Other Families or 
Practitioners, Jan. 8, 2007, 
http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/mmm2008-07-
24_12.50/blog/cns!E25811FD0AF7C45C!1826.entry [hereinafter 
Testimonials]; see The Humbling True Story of Why This Mother Wants Her 
Disabled Daughter to Have Her Womb Removed, MAIL ONLINE, Oct. 12, 
2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-487155/The-humbling-
true-story-mother-wants-disabled-daughter-womb-removed.html 
[hereinafter Humbling True Story]. 
 35. INVESTIGATIVE  REPORT, supra note  28, at 5; see also The 
Protection and Advocacy for Individual Rights Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794e 
(1973); Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 15041 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71A.10.080 (West 2008). 
 36. LETTER, supra note 5, at 4. 
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including representation by a guardian ad litem and a court 
order authorizing the procedure, Ashley’s constitutional rights 
had been violated.37 Their report stated that the treatment 
violated Ashley’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to 
choose to procreate.38 The WPAS also stated that because the 
growth attenuation therapy and breast bud removal were 
invasive and irreversible medical procedures, they should not 
have been performed without a court order.39 
In response to the situation, Children’s Hospital organized 
a symposium to discuss the issue of growth attenuation 
therapy in profoundly developmentally disabled children at the 
University of Washington School of Law.40 The event was 
designed to provide a forum in which bioethicists, members of 
the hospital ethics committee, members of the disability 
community, attorneys, and physicians could discuss the role 
and limits of parental decision-making, the appropriate 
response of health care professionals, and the views of the 
disability community in these situations.41 As a result of the 
symposium, a working panel was formed. The working panel 
issued a report of its initial work attempting to find areas of 
consensus among stakeholders and identify areas of continued 
disagreement for further discussion on January 23, 2009.42 
B. RELEVANT CASE LAW ON STERILIZATION. 
State case law regarding sterilization stems from the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell to 
uphold a Virginia statute that authorized the superintendent of 
                                                          
 37. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at 27. 
 38. Id. at 16, 23. 
 39. Id. at 24. 
 40. Treuman Katz Center for Pediatric Bioethics, The Ethical and 
Policy Implications of Limiting Growth in Children with Severe 
Disabilities,  
http://bioethics.seattlechildrens.org/events/the_ethical_and_policy_impli
cations_of_limiting_growth_in_children_with_severe_disabilities.asp (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Treuman Katz for Pediatric Bioethics, Evaluating Growth 
Attenuation in Children with Profound Disabilities: Interests of the Child, 
Family Decision-Making and Community Concerns, 
http://bioethics.seattlechildrens.org/events/the_ethical_and_policy_impli
cations_of_limiting_growth_in_children_with_severe_disabilities_2009.asp 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
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institutions to decide whether inmates should be sterilized.43 
The Court’s position was summarized in its infamous 
statement that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”44 
In time, the judicial tide changed: Skinner v. Oklahoma held 
that the right to procreate was a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.45 After this, the fundamental right to procreate, 
and to choose not to procreate, was addressed in cases 
involving contraception and abortion. In each of these, the 
Court affirmed that decisions regarding procreation were 
included in a “zone of privacy” created by the Bill of Rights and 
incorporated into state law through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46 State court decisions regarding sterilization 
petitions by the parents and guardians of developmentally 
disabled individuals have been addressed through the 
standards developed in these cases.47 
In Washington, where Ashley was treated, the controlling 
cases on sterilization petitions are In re Guardianship of 
Hayes48 and In re Guardianship of K.M.49 In Hayes, the mother 
of a sixteen-year-old girl, whose cognitive ability was at the 
level of a four or five-year-old, wanted to have her sexually-
                                                          
 43. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927); see generally Maura 
McIntyre, Note, Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to Evaluate 
the Best Interests of the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization Context, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1303 (2007) (analyzing approaches courts have taken when 
deciding on sterilization petitions). 
 44. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
 45. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down an 
Oklahoma law compelling sterilization for classes of criminals as 
unconstitutionally restricting fundamental liberty interests and violating 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the 
“right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 485-86 (1972) (stating that Griswold’s holding applied to individuals, 
as well as married couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-
85 (1965) (invalidating a Connecticut law which criminalized the use or 
distribution of contraception). 
 47. See Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled, 
8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 122, 137 (1993) (discussing relevant state court 
decisions). 
 48. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (en 
banc). 
 49. In re Guardianship of K.M., 816 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
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active daughter surgically sterilized to prevent pregnancy.50 
After discussing the history of eugenic sterilization statutes,51 
the court held that because sterilization impacts an 
individual’s fundamental rights of privacy and procreation, 
there is a “heavy presumption against sterilization of an 
individual incapable of informed consent that must be 
overcome by the person or entity requesting sterilization.”52 
The Hayes court described the way in which sterilization 
petitions must proceed in Washington: the decision must be 
made in a superior court proceeding in which, using a clear, 
cogent, and convincing standard, the court finds that: (1) a 
disinterested guardian ad litem represents the incompetent 
individual’s interests; (2) the court receives independent 
medical, psychological, and social evaluations; (3) the court 
hears and considers the individual’s views as much as 
possible; (4) the individual is incapable of making her own 
decision about sterilization and is unlikely to be able to in the 
foreseeable future; (5) the individual has a need for 
contraception, including findings that the individual is 
physically capable of procreation, likely to engage in sexual 
activity that is likely to lead to pregnancy in the near future, 
and is permanently incapable of caring for a child, even with 
reasonable assistance; and (6) that there are no alternatives to 
sterilization, other contraceptive measures have proved 
unworkable, the proposed sterilization is the least invasive 
option, a reversible or “less drastic” option will not be available 
soon, and there is not an impending advance in the treatment 
of the individual’s disability.53 
Hayes was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court in 
K.M., when a court order to allow sterilization was overruled 
because the guardian ad litem did not advocate vigorously on 
behalf of the individual she was representing and the 
individual’s attendance at trial was waived for half of the 
proceeding.54 The K.M. court based this opinion on the “gravity 
                                                          
 50. Hayes, 608 P.2d at 638. 
 51. Id. at 639 (describing the theory that mental illness, mental 
retardation, criminal behavior, and diseases were hereditary and 
preventing procreation by individuals afflicted with these problems would 
reduce the prevalence of these problems in society); see also Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 200 (1927). 
 52. Hayes, 608 P.2d at 639–41. 
 53. Id. at 641. 
 54. In re Guardianship of K.M., 816 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 
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and finality” of sterilization.55 
Courts in other states have addressed these issues with 
varying approaches. The year after Hayes, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court addressed the issue in In re Grady, when it 
upheld a sterilization petition brought by the parents of a 
nineteen-year-old woman with Down’s syndrome.56 The court 
found that there was also a right to be sterilized within the 
privacy rights related to contraception and procreation, “[a] 
decision to be sterilized is also a part of an individual’s right to 
control her own body and life. . . . Therefore, the right to be 
sterilized is included in the privacy rights protected by the 
federal Constitution.”57 
In Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hospital, Inc., the 
Maryland Court of Appeals required clear and convincing 
evidence to show that sterilization is in the best interest of the 
individual, but allowed courts somewhat more discretion to 
consider the relative weight of factors in making these 
decisions.58 The court then denied the petition of the 
guardians of a blind, neurologically impaired thirteen-year-old 
girl with an IQ of twenty-five to thirty, and the mental capacity 
of a one or two-year-old child.59 The guardians had petitioned 
to have a hysterectomy performed to address the girl’s pain, 
hygiene, and contraceptive issues.60 
While most courts limited the situations in which parents 
and guardians could request sterilization for those in their 
care, the California Supreme Court held that the right to make 
this choice on behalf of their conservatees could not be 
statutorily eliminated.61 The statute at issue in Valerie N., was 
one that denied courts the authority to grant a conservator the 
power to consent to sterilization on behalf of the severely 
                                                          
1991). 
 55. Id.  
 56. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (N.J. 1981). 
 57. Id. at 474. 
 58. Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1253–
54 (Md. 1982); see generally John Handy Culver III, Wentzel v. 
Montgomery General Hospital—Maryland’s Equitable Jurisdiction over 
Sterilization Petitions: A Constitutional Analysis, 42 MD. L. REV. 549, 569 
(1983) (arguing that the standard used by the Wentzel court allowed 
courts too much discretion). 
 59. Wentzel, 447 A.2d at 1255. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 168 (Cal. 1985). 
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developmentally disabled conservatee, even in cases in which 
no less “intrusive method” of contraception was available. The 
California Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional 
because it was “constitutionally overbroad.”62 
C.  APPROACHES TO SURROGATE DECISIONS REGARDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Decisions on sterilization petitions, for those who are 
unable to give legal consent, use one of four standards: (1) 
“mandatory criteria,” where courts authorize sterilization only 
where specified finding are made; (2) “discretionary best 
interest,” where courts must evaluate designated criteria to 
determine if sterilization is in the best interest of the 
incompetent person; (3) “substituted judgment,” where criteria 
are used that presumably allow the court to make the decision 
the incompetent person would have made for herself; and (4) 
statutes prohibiting sterilization if the candidate for the 
procedure is unable to provide informed consent.63 Hayes is 
an example of a mandatory criteria decision.64 
Substituted judgment is used when a person who was 
competent to make a decision is no longer able to make this 
decision for herself, and a court or guardian makes the 
decision based on what the person would have wanted65 or, 
alternatively, based on what most people in that situation 
would want.66 For example, in In re Quinlan, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the only “practical way” for twenty-
one-year-old Karen Quinlan, who was in a persistent vegetative 
state following a drug overdose, to exercise her privacy rights 
                                                          
 62. Id. 
 63. George P. Smith II, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the 
Mentally Handicapped,  4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y  71, 81 (1988) 
(citing  Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: 
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy,  1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 807 (1986)). 
 64. See Smith, supra note 63, at 79. 
 65. See Norman L. Cantor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based 
Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 
37 (2004) [hereinafter Cantor I]. This doctrine was first used in English 
common law to make decisions for individuals formerly competent to 
make decisions. Louise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the 
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 34–55 (1990) 
(describing the history of the doctrine of substituted judgment). 
 66. Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making Defining 
the Best Interests of Never-Competent Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 157 
(2005) [hereinafter Cantor II]. 
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to choose whether to continue the use of a respirator was to 
allow her parents to substitute their judgment for hers.67 The 
court allowed them to do so, even though Karen had not made 
a legally admissible statement of what she would have wanted 
in that situation.68 
In In re Jobes, the court stated that its role in cases 
involving termination of life support was not to decide what 
should happen to the patient, but “. . . to establish for those 
who make that decision criteria that respect the right to self-
determination and yet protect incompetent patients.”69 The 
court went on to hold that while the court could not determine 
by clear and convincing evidence what the woman in a 
vegetative state would have wanted, it would defer the decision 
to her family’s substituted judgment.70 The court reasoned 
that families are in the best position to decide what is in the 
person’s best interest.71 This case illustrates the difficulty of 
distinguishing the substituted judgment from the best interest 
standard. For the profoundly developmentally disabled, the 
substituted judgment standard is actually a best interest 
standard, because the decision-maker cannot know what the 
person would have wanted, so instead makes a best interest 
determination.72 
In Strunk v. Strunk the Kentucky Supreme Court used a 
substituted judgment standard for someone who had never 
been capable of making his own decisions.73 Jerry Strunk was 
an institutionalized, twenty-seven-year-old man with an IQ of 
thirty five, a mental age of six, and a close relationship with his 
twenty-eight-year-old brother who was dying of kidney 
failure.74 Strunk’s mother petitioned the court to allow Jerry to 
donate a kidney to his brother, and the court analyzed what 
would be in Strunk’s best interest by using its substituted 
judgment before allowing the donation.75 
                                                          
 67. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976). 
 68. Id. at 653. 
 69. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 437–38 (N.J. 1987). 
 70. Id. at 443. 
 71. Id. at 447–48. 
 72. See Cantor II, supra note 66, at 158. 
 73. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969); Harmon, supra 
note 65, at 34–35. 
 74. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146. 
 75. Id. at 149. 
KORNBLATT J.  The Ashley Treatment: The Current Legal Framework Protects the Wrong 
Rights.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 773-800. 
2009] THE ASHLEY TREATMENT 785 
Due to the impossibility of separating the two standards 
for those who have always been profoundly developmentally 
disabled, many courts have abandoned substituted judgment 
in favor of a best interest standard.76 Some have criticized the 
idea of using either standard, because they feel the potential 
for abuse and decisions made based on negative stereotypes of 
the disabled outweighs the advantages of allowing the 
decisions to be made.77 
Professor John Garvey suggests several ways for the state 
to protect the rights of those who are unable to exercise their 
right to make constitutionally protected decisions, and argues 
that which should be used depends on the permanency and 
severity of the person’s disability.78 Garvey argues that if the 
state wants to protect the constitutional freedoms of those who 
are not, have not, and will never be able to make decisions due 
to profound cognitive disability, it should allow surrogate 
decision-makers to exercise these rights on their behalf.79 
In addition to the right to make choices regarding privacy 
and procreation, those incapable of making decisions are 
unable to exercise their Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
maintain human dignity and avoid severe pain. In Washington 
v. Glucksberg, the United States Supreme Court emphasized 
the importance of protecting these rights for those unable to 
exercise them for themselves.80 “Avoiding intolerable pain and 
the indignity of living one’s final days incapacitated and in 
agony is certainly ‘[a]t the heart of [the] liberty . . . to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.’”81 
State court cases have addressed these issues. In 
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that an institutionalized, 
elderly man with the mental ability of a two-year-old had a 
                                                          
 76. Id. 
 77. See Cantor I, supra note 65, at 42–43. 
 78. John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1762 (1981) (describing “conceptions of . . . laissez 
faire. . . .[i]nstrumental. . . . surrogate choices. . . .[and situations where] 
the state has a duty to act in their interests. . .”). 
 79. Id. at 1778. 
 80. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 745 (1997). 
 81. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)). 
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dignity interest in not having chemotherapy performed.82 The 
court reasoned that since most people are able to endure the 
debilitating side effects of chemotherapy because they 
understand its purpose, the pain from the treatment would be 
unbearable for Saikewicz, who would not have this 
understanding.83 Therefore, the court stated that it had made 
a substituted judgment on his behalf to forego the 
chemotherapy.84 
D.  THE ROLE OF STATE STATUTES. 
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute 
requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent 
patient’s prior wish to have life support terminated in a case 
where the parents of a woman in a chronic vegetative state 
sought to terminate her life support.85 The Court clarified that 
its holding meant only that the Constitution did not prohibit 
this procedural requirement, not that states were required to 
use this standard.86 
Other states have used this ability to pass statutes that 
specify procedures for termination of life support. In 
Conservatorship of Drabick, the California Court of Appeals 
held that a state probate statute permitted a conservator to 
choose to remove a feeding tube from their conservatee when 
the decision was made in good faith, based on medical advice, 
and in the best interest of the conservatee.87 The court stated 
that the constitutional rights of those unable to make these 
decisions for themselves were best served by allowing 
conservators to make these decisions based on the 
                                                          
 82. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass. 1977). 
 83. Id. at 432. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 
(1990); see generally Carl Hernandez III, Note, Legitimate Exercise of 
Parens Patriae Doctrine: State Power to Determine an Incompetent 
Individual’s “Right to Die” After Cruzan ex. rel. Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, 6  BYU J. PUB. L. 167, 168 (1992) 
(arguing that the Cruzan case was correctly decided and promoting the 
use of state parens patriae power). 
 86. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
 87. Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 200 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
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conservators’ particular interests rather than a set of technical 
standards.88 
In In re Guardianship of Hamlin, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that a state statute that granted guardians 
authority to “‘care for and maintain the incompetent or 
disabled person, assert his or her rights and best interests, 
and provide timely, informed consent to necessary medical 
procedures’” meant that a guardian was authorized to make a 
decision to terminate life support.89 The court then laid out 
guidelines for how this could be done,90 but ultimately called 
on the state legislature to create a statute specific to these 
situations.91 
E. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS. 
Parental requests to have these treatments performed on 
their children also raise issues of the constitutional rights of 
parents to make decisions regarding their children. The right of 
parents to make decisions regarding how to raise their children 
has been held to be a fundamental right, although subject to 
limitations.92 Examples include the right of parents to decide 
whether their children should study a foreign language93 and 
whether their child should attend public or private school.94 
The right of parents to make medical decisions for their 
children has been upheld in cases involving statutes requiring 
parental consent for minors to obtain abortions.95 State courts 
have also upheld the right of parents to make decisions 
regarding medical treatment based on the parents’ religious 
beliefs.96 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 208–09. 
 89. In re Guardianship of Hamlin 689 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wash. 1984) 
(citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.040 (West 1990)). 
 90. Id. at 1378–79. The court held that the decision should be made 
between the guardian, families, physician, and hospital, with court 
intervention if there was a disagreement between the parties. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1379. 
 92. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (quoting 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (stating that the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that it is a fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions for their children). 
 93. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
 94. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 95. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992). 
 96. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Del. 1991); In re 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF PROFOUNDLY DISABLED CHILDREN. 
In its report, the WPAS cited Hayes as holding that “. . . 
unlike other medical procedures, parental consent is 
inadequate in cases involving sterilization.”97 The report goes 
on to say that the breast bud removal and hormone treatment 
aspects of the Ashley Treatment also infringed on Ashley’s 
liberty interests and should not have been performed without 
court approval and representation by a guardian ad litem.98 
The report does not say what standard of review the court 
should have used in making decisions regarding breast bud 
removal and hormone treatment.99 
Had Ashley’s parents sought judicial approval, it is 
unlikely that they would have overcome the “heavy 
presumption against sterilization”100 and been granted a court 
order allowing the hysterectomy. While they would likely have 
been able to satisfy some of the mandatory criteria, Ashley’s 
parents would not have be able to show, by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that Ashley needed contraception and was 
likely to engage in sexual activity that was likely to lead to 
pregnancy because Ashley is not capable of voluntary sexual 
intercourse. Nor would they be able to show that there were no 
alternatives to sterilization, that other contraception had not 
worked, and that this was the least invasive method of 
contraception. Like the court in Wentzel, 101 it is unlikely that a 
Washington court would have found that the proposed 
procedure was warranted to address menstrual pain. 
B. THE HAYES STANDARD IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE ASHLEY  
TREATMENT. 
The Hayes standard is not appropriate for all decisions to 
                                                          
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 348 (Pa. 1972). 
 97. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at 19 (citing In re 
Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1980) (en banc)). 
 98. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at 24. 
 99. Id. 
 100. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (Wash. 1980) (en 
banc). 
 101. Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1255 
(Md. 1982); see also Smith, supra note 63, at 81. 
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perform medical treatments resulting in sterilization of those 
who are unable to consent to the procedures. While the 
proposed treatments for Hayes, K.M., and Ashley all resulted 
in sterilization, Hayes and K.M. were differently situated than 
Ashley and others with profound neurologic and cognitive 
disabilities. Hayes and K.M. were able to walk, talk, and 
discuss issues of parenting, even if their comprehension of the 
issues was limited.102 Hayes and K.M. had IQs two to three 
times greater than what Ashley would be expected to score on 
an IQ test.103 Their mental abilities were similar to those of a 
four to five and a six to seven-year-old, while Ashley’s is that of 
an infant.104 
Hayes and K.M. were teenagers, whose parents believed 
them to be sexually active, and the procedures were requested 
to prevent pregnancy.105 It is logical to focus on protecting the 
choice to procreate for those who could voluntarily—even if 
without complete understanding—exercise that right. This is 
not analogous to those who are so profoundly disabled that the 
only way they could procreate would be through sexual 
assault. Children with profound neurological and cognitive 
disabilities will never feed themselves, have a conversation, or 
understand concepts such as becoming a parent—they will 
require care for all of their needs their entire lives. Someone in 
that situation cannot exercise their choice to procreate 
whether or not they have the physical ability to get pregnant. 
By focusing on procreation, the Hayes standard protects a 
right that is not actually available to these children, while 
failing to adequately protect rights that the children could 
exercise through the decisions of their surrogates. As a result, 
these children are not able to exercise other fundamental 
rights, such as dignity, freedom from pain, and life. Availing 
themselves of these rights could have a meaningful impact on 
their existence, through greater mobility and contact with 
family members, less pain, and improved health. 
If the Hayes standard were a statute, it would not be 
narrowly tailored to the state’s interests, as is required of a 
                                                          
 102. Hayes, 608 P.2d at 637; In re Guardianship of K.M., 816  P.2d 71, 
72–73 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); LETTER, supra note 5, at 2. 
 103. LETTER, supra  note 5, at 2. 
 104. Hayes, 608 P.2d at 637; K.M., 816 P.2d at 72–73; Gunther & 
Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 105. Hayes, 608 P.2d at 637; K.M., 816  P.2d at 72–73; LETTER, supra 
note 5, at 2. 
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statute affecting individuals’ fundamental rights.106 To be 
narrowly tailored, a law cannot be under-inclusive or over-
inclusive, and must be the least restrictive means available.107 
The Hayes standard would be under-inclusive because it 
focuses on one aspect of the treatment while ignoring the 
fundamental liberty interests involved in the other aspects of 
the treatments. The law would also be over-inclusive because it 
attempts to analyze all medical procedures which result in 
sterilization by one standard that is tailored to address 
requests for medical procedures for contraceptive purposes. It 
would also be over-inclusive in its applicability to people with a 
wide range of disability levels. Therefore, the standard’s 
mandatory criteria are overly restrictive. 
The Hayes standard contrasts with the approach used in 
Canada, where more deference is given to parent or guardian 
requests for “therapeutic reasons” than for contraceptive 
reasons.108 This approach is more appropriate because it 
emphasizes the candidate’s holistic needs and how all the 
costs and benefits of a procedure would affect her, rather than 
placing an undue emphasis on the right to choose whether to 
procreate. For those who are profoundly cognitively and 
neurologically disabled, the Canadian approach is better suited 
to the fact that they will never be able to exercise a choice to 
procreate, but through their surrogate can exercise the rights 
of life, dignity, and avoiding pain. 
C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO BETTER PROTECTING 
COMPETING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 
Garvey also advocates interpreting the “life” of the “life, 
liberty, and property” rights protected in the Constitution 
expansively, so that the life protected is a “life worth living.”109 
This distinction becomes critical in cases involving medical 
decisions for those unable to provide informed consent. The 
                                                          
 106. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a 
statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by 
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate 
those results.”). 
 107. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 653 
(1992). 
 108. Smith, supra note 63, at 82–83. 
 109. Garvey, supra note 78, at 1785–86. 
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reasons Ashley’s parents wanted the procedures performed 
was to make Ashley’s life more “worth living” by increasing the 
likelihood that she could remain with her family and 
experiencing greater mobility, better health, and less pain.110 
Because what is “worth living” depends on the specifics of a 
given situation, cases addressing these issues have 
contextualized which rights should be emphasized and how 
severe pain must be before its avoidance becomes a 
constitutional right based on the circumstances of the parties 
involved. 
The issue of how to weigh the rights to avoid severe pain 
and bodily invasion against the intangible aspects of 
connection to family and life itself played a role in Glucksberg, 
Saikewicz, and Strunk.111 In Glucksberg and Saikewicz, the 
courts weighed the value of living in severe pain against the 
value of simply being alive and found that the right to avoid 
pain and live in dignity could, in some circumstances, 
outweigh the ability to be kept alive.112 In Saikewicz, the court 
held that the deciding factor in the choice of whether to allow 
the chemotherapy to be withheld was that it would be too 
much pain to endure for someone who could not understand 
the cause of the pain.113 While menstrual pain might not 
normally be held severe enough that its avoidance is a 
constitutionally protected right,114 it may in fact be for 
someone unable to comprehend this recurring and often severe 
pain, particularly when combined with bed sores, chafing 
straps, and scoliosis. 
In Strunk the court held that the value of saving the life of 
Strunk’s brother, to whom Strunk was deeply attached, 
                                                          
 110. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014; Ashley’s Blog, supra 
note 10. 
 111. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 745 (1997); Strunk v. 
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Ky. 1969); Superintendent of Belchertown 
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 420, 432 (Mass. 1976). 
 112. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432. 
 113. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (holding that the probate judge’s 
use of “quality of life” should be understood as a reference to a continued 
state of pain and disorientation due to chemotherapy; the Saikewicz court 
chose to balance this  “quality of life” against the possibility of remission 
and affirmed the decision to withhold treatment). 
 114. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Cases have held that 
“avoiding the difficulties or inconveniences” of menstrual hygiene cannot 
be  considered  in a decision to sterilize someone incompetent to consent. 
Smith, supra note 63, at 81. 
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outweighed the pain and bodily invasion of an organ removal 
and donation.115 Similar to the intangible worth of Saikewicz 
having his brother in his life, the intangible benefits to Ashley 
of living at home with her family, experiencing greater physical 
contact and mobility, better health, and more frequent and 
varied outings outweigh the costs of surgery, organ removal, 
and loss of the physical ability to procreate. Emphasizing the 
more concrete, but less applicable, right to choose procreation 
shortchanges the importance of these intangible benefits. 
D. PARENTS SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THESE DECISIONS ON 
THEIR CHILDREN’S BEHALF. 
As the Quinlan and Grady courts and Professor Norman 
Cantor suggest, without the ability of surrogates to make 
decisions on their behalf, those who have never been 
competent to decide have no way to exercise these 
constitutional rights.116 Those closest to the person are in the 
best position to decide which, and in what manner, these 
rights should be exercised. In her Cruzan concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor addressed the importance of allowing those closest 
to someone who cannot make decisions to make those 
decisions on their behalf: “In my view, such a duty may well be 
constitutionally required to protect the patient’s liberty 
interest. . . .”117 
The primary reason that Ashley’s parents requested these 
treatments was to increase her chances of continuing to live at 
home and have greater interaction with parents, siblings, and 
the world outside her home.118 Ashley’s favorite activities 
would likely be diminished if she grew to her anticipated 
size.119 She would need a lift to move her from her bed and her 
                                                          
 115. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 147. 
 116. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976); In re Grady, 426 
A.2d 467, 480–81 (N.J. 1981); Cantor II, supra note 66, at 156. 
 117. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 118. Ashley’s Blog, supra note 10. 
 119. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1013. “The American 
Academy of Pediatrics recently endorsed the goal of Healthy People 2010 
to have all children with disabilities out of congregate care facilities and 
into homes by the year 2010.” Id. Moving disabled children into homes 
becomes much harder as the person gets larger: “[t]he difficulties of caring 
for these children—dressing, bathing, diapering, transferring from bed to 
wheelchair, transporting—increase exponentially as the children grow to 
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family would have to replace her usual fleece lined stroller with 
a wheelchair, which causes her great discomfort.120 
Cantor suggests that for those who cannot make decisions 
for themselves, an alternative form of substituted judgment is 
to consider what a majority of people would do in the same 
situation.121 Those closest to nonambulatory, profoundly 
developmentally disabled children would be in the best 
position to provide this insight. Ashley’s parents received over 
1,150 emails from parents and caregivers with direct 
experience caring for children with similar conditions.122 These 
included: a mother who felt she failed her daughter when she 
was forced to institutionalize her when she could no longer 
care for her due to her size, a person whose cousin died from 
menstrual hygiene issues, a woman who wished she was able 
to provide this treatment to her now sixteen-year-old daughter, 
a couple in New Zealand who were investigating the possibility 
of obtaining these procedures for their daughter, and a nurse 
whose patient stopped using her crawler because of discomfort 
caused by her size D breasts.123 Ashley’s parents also received 
emails from dozens of parents considering the treatment for 
their children.124 A British newspaper ran a story about a 
woman in England who regrets that this treatment was not 
available when her daughter was younger.125 It seems 
reasonable to use the sentiments of those who are closest to 
those who are unable to make decisions for themselves—such 
as the people described above—to determine what the majority 
of those in the same situation would do. This could then be a 
basis for a substituted judgment. 
One criticism of the Ashley Treatment is that it is a form of 
eugenics.126 This type of criticism, as well as the Hayes 
standard’s focus on preserving the right to procreate at the 
expense of other rights, can be viewed as a backlash to the 
abuses created during the eugenics movement. But every 
decision that leads to sterilization of a woman or girl who is 
unable to consent is not eugenics, and there is no indication 
                                                          
adolescence and adulthood.” Id. 
 120. Ashley’s Blog, supra note 10. 
 121. Cantor II, supra note 66, at 157–58. 
 122. Ashley’s Blog, supra note 10. 
 123. Testimonials, supra note 34. 
 124. Treatment Summary, supra note 16. 
 125. Humbling True Story, supra note 34. 
 126. Larry King Live, supra note 31. 
KORNBLATT J.  The Ashley Treatment: The Current Legal Framework Protects the Wrong 
Rights.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 773-800. 
794 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
that this was the case for Ashley or would be for others in 
similar situations. Ashley’s parents opted for the treatment 
because they determined it was in her best interest, not to 
prevent her from passing on a mental disability. The California 
Supreme Court in Valerie N. acknowledged that sterilization 
decisions by guardians can be made for appropriate reasons 
and held that California could not pass a law that prohibited 
conservators from authorizing sterilization for their 
conservatees.127 
A frequent criticism of this treatment has been its 
potential for abuse and the possibility of using medical 
treatments to control children who are problematic to their 
parents. As Princeton bioethicist Peter Singer points out, the 
large and growing number of children on medication to treat 
attention deficit disorder poses a greater risk of this than a 
treatment that is potentially applicable to only a small number 
of the most profoundly disabled children.128 Profoundly 
developmentally disabled children and their families should 
not be denied the ability to choose one of the few options 
available to them because of general concerns of a negative 
impact on other disabled children in quite different 
circumstances. 
A related criticism is that decisions will be made based on 
stereotypes. In Ashley’s case, the treatment plan was based on 
her individual needs. Ashley’s treatment was not a statement 
about the relative value of disabled and non-disabled people, 
whether society feels disabled people should have children, or 
whether disabled people are capable of doing more than others 
assume or allow them to do. The fact that many of the 
disability advocates speaking out on this issue are disabled 
themselves129 illustrates the broad range of abilities and 
situations among those that are lumped together as “disabled” 
and the difficulty of making generalizations of what is best for 
those who are disabled as a group.130 The treatment was 
intended to, and did help, Ashley live the fullest life she could, 
not to limit her options based on her disability. 
                                                          
 127. Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 168 (Cal. 1985). 
 128. Singer, supra note 32, at A21. 
 129. Larry King Live, supra note 31. 
 130. James. W.  Ellis, Decisions by and for People with Mental 
Retardation: Balancing Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 
VILL. L. REV. 1779, 1779 (1992). 
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Decisions on whether to perform this type of treatment 
should include a consideration of all the constitutional rights 
at issue, medical prognosis, and the specifics of the person’s 
situation. In Cruzan, the Court recognized Quinlan’s 
reasoning131 and stated that “. . . there comes a point at which 
the individual’s rights overcome the State interest . . . .  [T]he 
State’s interest ‘weakens and the individual’s right to privacy 
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the 
prognosis dims.’”132 This statement considers the changing 
weight of interests as prognosis changes in a terminally-ill 
patient. It seems reasonable that a similar interest-weighing 
process should occur for those who have a wide range of 
disabilities and whose parents or guardians are seeking, in 
their best interest, a medical treatment resulting in 
sterilization or other permanent effects. A blanket standard 
that attempts to address all of these varying prognoses seems 
likely to produce inappropriate outcomes. 
E. PARENTS’ RIGHTS TO MAKE DECISIONS REGARDING THEIR 
CHILDREN. 
Parents’ ability to make decisions regarding their children 
has been held to be a fundamental constitutional right;133 the 
Supreme Court has stated that: 
[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that 
the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct 
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our 
society. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”134 
Requiring parents of nonambulatory, profoundly 
neurologically and cognitively disabled children to obtain a 
court order based on criteria that are not tailored to their 
situation effectively—and inappropriately—eliminates one of 
the very few options they have available to do what they feel is 
                                                          
 131. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990). 
 132. Id. 
 133. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895, 
965 (1992); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating 
that the Supreme Court has consistently held that it respects parental 
privacy and freedom in making  choices regarding raising their children); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 
510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see supra 
notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 134. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (quoting Prince, 
321 U.S. at 166). 
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in the best interest of their children. While the right of parents 
to make decisions for their children is not absolute, a number 
of state cases have addressed the ability to withhold treatment 
based on their religious beliefs.135 
In Newmark v. Williams the parents of a three-year-old boy 
with cancer refused chemotherapy for their son due to their 
religious beliefs and the negative effects of the treatment.136 
The boy’s doctor advocated for the boy to be treated and 
removed from his family home for the treatment because the 
doctor believed the family’s beliefs would prevent them from 
providing all the prescribed treatment and care.137 The court 
weighed the prognosis, the effects and likelihood of success of 
treatment, the importance of the child remaining with his 
family, and the child’s right to life, against the state’s interest 
in the child’s life and the parents’ right to evaluate the value of 
attempting to save their child’s life compared to letting their 
child live only a few months—but without the debilitating side 
effects of the chemotherapy.138 The court determined that due 
to the likely pain of the procedure, the forty percent likelihood 
of a cure, and the trauma to the boy of being away from his 
family—none of which he would be able to comprehend—it was 
in the boy’s best interest to remain with his family and forego 
the treatment.139 
A similar approach should be used to allow parents of 
nonambulatory, profoundly  neurologically and cognitively 
impaired children to decide what is in the best interest of their 
child, with appropriate safeguards for situations in which the 
parents’ purported best interest decisions are made for other 
reasons or not in the child’s best interest. For parents of 
children who are profoundly disabled, the majority of the 
decisions they must make for their children are medical ones. 
This should not limit the parents’ constitutional rights to make 
decisions regarding their children, unless there is reason to 
believe that, in doing so, they inappropriately infringe on the 
child’s rights. While there may be exceptions, in a majority of 
                                                          
 135. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1120–21 (Del. 
1991); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. Super. 
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 136. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1111. 
 137. Id. at 1119. 
 138. Id. at 1117–18. 
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circumstances, the family is in the best position to make a 
decision for its loved one. This should be the presumption, 
with parents’ decision-making ability limited only when there 
is reason to believe this is not the case. In Jobes, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
Family members are best qualified to make substituted 
judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their 
peculiar grasp of the patient’s approach to life, but also because 
of their special bonds with him or her. Our common human 
experience informs us that family members are generally most 
concerned with the welfare of a patient. It is they who provide for 
the patient’s comfort, care, and best interests . . . .140 
Garvey argues that in cases protecting the liberties of 
children, “what the Constitution protects is not a choice that 
the child has made but one that his parents have determined 
is beneficial to him.”141 For children who are profoundly 
neurologically and cognitively disabled, the two interests are 
particularly enmeshed, as the child will never be able to make 
decisions for herself.  Therefore, protecting the rights of 
parents to make decisions is also a way of protecting the 
child’s only way to express her interests. 
F. STATES SHOULD ENACT STATUTES ADDRESSING THESE 
DECISIONS. 
Requiring parents of profoundly neurologically and 
cognitively disabled children to seek court approval, based on 
criteria created to address sterilization petitions requested for 
contraceptive reasons, impermissibly infringes on the 
constitutional rights of these children and their parents. States 
should enact legislation specifically addressing these 
situations. In her Cruzan concurrence, Justice O’Connor 
stated support for state action of this type: 
[N]o national consensus has yet emerged on the best solution for 
this difficult and sensitive problem. Today we decide only that one 
State’s practice does not violate the Constitution; the more 
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for 
safeguarding incompetents’ liberty interests is entrusted to the 
“laboratory” of the States.142 
Without state legislative action, courts, such as the Hayes 
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 141. Garvey, supra note 78, at 1782. 
 142. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) 
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court, have inappropriately assumed this legislative role.143 
States should enact statutes which allow parents and 
guardians of nonambulatory, profoundly neurologically and 
cognitively disabled children to decide, with their children’s 
doctors, to have this treatment performed if they feel it is in 
their children’s best interest to do so. Safeguards should 
include the agreement of two doctors and a hospital ethics 
committee, with recourse to a court if all parties are not in 
agreement. In a court proceeding, a guardian ad litem should 
represent the child’s interest, and the court should use a “best 
interest” standard to make its determination. This framework 
addresses the procedures’ gravity and permanency by 
requiring more procedural safeguards than are used in most 
parental medical decisions. At the same time, it allows most 
families to have the procedures performed without requiring 
already heavily-burdened families to obtain legal counsel and 
justify their position to a court—unless doctors and a hospital 
ethics committee do not agree with their decision. Cantor 
argues that the education of surrogates and medical personnel 
and the use of hospital ethics committees or courts when a 
treatment used does not fall within “acceptable standards of 
patient care” provide protection from abuses through these 
decisions.144 It is worth noting that this is essentially the 
process that occurred before Ashley was treated.145 
In his Cruzan dissent, Justice Stevens cited the courts in 
Saikewicz and Drabick when he stated that respect for those 
who cannot make decisions for themselves should allow 
surrogates to make decisions on their behalf by considering 
that person’s best interests.146 It seems likely that a court 
would have found Ashley’s treatment warranted under a best 
interests standard; the hospital ethics committee, Ashley’s 
doctors, and her parents decided that this treatment was in 
Ashley’s best interest.147 A court order to perform the 
procedure, however, would have been unlikely under the 
                                                          
 143. Smith, supra note 63, at 79. 
 144. Cantor I, supra note 65, at 70. 
 145. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 146. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 349 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing In re 
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Hayes standard, which would have governed at least the 
hysterectomy portion of the procedure had Ashley’s parents 
gone to court. 
A state statute enabling parents of children whose doctors 
and parents feel that the Ashley Treatment is in the child’s 
best interest to make these decisions would answer the 
Washington Supreme Court’s parallel request in Hamlin that 
state legislatures enact statutes detailing procedures that 
would allow surrogates to make decisions on whether to 
terminate life support for patients in persistent vegetative 
states.148 This is also consistent with Professor George Smith’s 
argument that families are best able to protect the candidate’s 
best interest, and therefore the family “alone,” rather than an 
“impersonal” court, should make the decision—with the court 
available to protect the patients’ best interest if there is a 
conflict of interest between the parents and the doctors.149  
Requiring hospital ethics committee approval provides an 
additional safeguard of these children’s rights and interests. 
A statute allowing parents of nonambulatory, profoundly 
neurologically and cognitively disabled children to choose this 
type of treatment for their child would be narrowly tailored to 
protect the state’s compelling interest in procreation150 and 
protecting its citizens from bodily invasion,151 while not 
infringing on the children’s rights to dignity,152 avoidance of 
pain,153 and life154 or the parents’ right to make decisions 
regarding the care and well-being of their children.155 Because 
there are not mandatory criteria that must be met before the 
decision to have the procedures performed, a statute of this 
type would be the least restrictive means available to ensure 
the competing interests in these situations are adequately 
protected. The statute would not be under- or over-inclusive, 
because instead of applying to sterilization decisions made by 
surrogates for those who are unable to consent regardless of 
the level of their disability and the reason for the procedure 
that would result in sterilization, it would apply to a specific 
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 149. Smith, supra note 63, at 88–89. 
 150. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes111–14 and accompanying text. 
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type of treatment and to only one to two percent of 
developmentally disabled children156 who meet the treatment 
criteria. Therefore, it is likely that if challenged, the proposed 
statute would pass the rigors of strict scrutiny review. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Note considers the current legal framework applied to 
a decision made by parents of a nonambulatory, profoundly 
developmentally disabled girl to have growth attenuation and 
other associated treatments performed. The Note then analyzes 
whether this framework adequately protects the best interest 
and constitutional rights of potential candidates for this 
treatment and their parents. The Note concludes that it does 
not. The Note suggests that states should enact statutes that 
are narrowly tailored to these cases in order to address and 
protect the multiple rights and interests involved in these 
situations. These statutes—which should include procedural 
safeguards—should allow the treatment when parents and 
doctors agree that it is in the child’s best interest. 
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